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NOTE
Standing in the Way of the FTAIA: Exceptional
Applications of Illinois Brick
Jennifer Fischell*
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act
(FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of
U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions
than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently
interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of
these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser
rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA.
Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from anti-
trust violators are typically permitted to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act
for treble damages. There are several court-created exceptions to this rule that
allow indirect purchasers to sue under section 4. This Note addresses the open
question of whether courts should apply these exceptions in the FTAIA context.
The Seventh Circuit recently discussed this question in Motorola Mobility
LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., implying that courts should not recognize Illi-
nois Brick’s exceptions in the FTAIA context. This Note argues for a different
interpretation of the case—one that supports the effective deterrence of anti-
trust violations while vindicating the need to compensate American consumers
who are foreseeably, substantially, and directly damaged by foreign anticom-
petitive conduct. Based on an analysis of the purpose of the Illinois Brick
doctrine and the text of the FTAIA, this Note concludes that when an excep-
tion to Illinois Brick would permit indirect purchasers to sue in the domestic
context, U.S. courts should also allow indirect purchasers to sue under the
FTAIA.
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Introduction
The following hypothetical implicates many of the concerns this Note
confronts:
At the annual Computer Speaker Manufacturers’ Conference, the producers of
computer speakers in Europe and Asia conspire to price fix, forming an inter-
national cartel artificially inflating the price of computer speakers.1 After the
formation of the conspiracy, one of the conspirators, Mono Polly Speakers, Inc.
(the supplier), sells its artificially expensive product to Computer Direct, a
computer manufacturer in a small Asian country. Once it purchases the
overcharged goods, Computer Direct is a direct purchaser from Mono Polly.
This means that, if all of the parties were in the United States, Computer
Direct would have standing2 to sue Mono Polly for antitrust damages under
the Illinois Brick doctrine.3 Computer Direct could accrue damages in one of
three ways. First, Computer Direct might keep its computer prices the same,
sell the same number of computers, and lose profits equivalent to Mono Polly’s
overcharge on the speakers. Second, it could increase sales prices by the exact
amount of the overcharge. In this scenario, Computer Direct would pass on
the overcharge to its customers.4 Although this would bring in the same per-
unit profits, the increased price may diminish demand for the computers,
thereby reducing sales numbers. Finally, Computer Direct might take a middle
path: increase the sales price by some amount less than the total overcharge,
losing some profits and losing some sales.
Mono Polly’s anticompetitive conduct also reaches American commerce be-
cause Computer Direct and other similar foreign manufacturers sell com-
puters to consumers and department stores in the United States. Assuming
that Computer Direct and others pass on a portion of the overcharge by in-
creasing their sales prices, American purchasers are damaged because they pay
more for the product than they would have absent the price fixing. Since the
1. This would be illegal under U.S. antitrust laws. See generally Daniel A. Crane, An-
titrust 59–66 (2014) (discussing horizontal conspiracies and price-fixing arrangements).
2. For purposes of this Note, “standing” does not refer to the “case or controversy”
requirement under Article III of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, but rather to
statutory standing under the FTAIA and standing under the antitrust laws, where plaintiffs
must have the sort of injury that antitrust laws are meant to correct. See infra Section I.A.
3. This direct purchaser rule generally limits standing under section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012), to those who purchased directly from antitrust violators. Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
4. See infra Section I.A for a description of the pass-on effect.
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U.S. consumers and department stores did not buy directly from Mono Polly,
they are indirect purchasers in antitrust terms.5 In the typical case in which all
parties are located in the United States, indirect purchasers (and, accordingly,
the U.S. consumers in this case) would generally be unable to sue Mono Polly
under the Illinois Brick doctrine.6
When Computer Direct discovers the speaker price-fixing conspiracy, it wants
to recover damages from Mono Polly. Unfortunately, Mono Polly’s home na-
tion does not allow civil damages for antitrust violations, and the laws in
Computer Direct’s home nation are similarly unhelpful. Knowing that the
United States has particularly aggressive civil remedies for antitrust violations,
Computer Direct would like to sue Mono Polly there.7 Once Computer Direct
brings suit in the United States, the major department stores and their cus-
tomers become interested in recovering damages as well. Because the antitrust
activities originated abroad, all parties seeking to bring suit must fit their cases
within the confines of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA).8 The indirect purchasers in the United States, if not confronted with
the direct purchaser rule, might have standing. As long as they could demon-
strate the requisite statutory effects on American commerce, they would likely
be able to show that those effects gave rise to their claim.9 Computer Direct
and other foreign direct purchasers would be unable to do that, however, be-
cause foreign conduct, independent of any effect on American commerce,
caused their harm.10 Although there were effects on American commerce, these
effects (increased prices in the United States) were not the cause of Computer
Direct’s antitrust injury—“[r]ather, it was the foreign effects of the price fix-
ing scheme (increased prices abroad).”11
5. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207 (1990) (defining indirect pur-
chaser as anyone who is not the “immediate buyer[ ] from the alleged antitrust violator[ ]”).
6. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16 (mentioning a possible exception to this rule).
7. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits plaintiffs to recover treble damages (three times
the actual damages) and attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
8. Id. § 6a. The FTAIA creates a general rule that the antitrust laws (specifically, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7, the Sherman Act) “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations,” and then establishes
exceptions to that rule. Id. § 6a. To bring a lawsuit under an exception, Computer Direct
would have to show that Mono Polly’s actions had “a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect” on American commerce, and that such effect “gives rise to a claim” and anti-
trust injury (such as illegal price fixing and a reduction in competition) under the antitrust
laws. Id.; see also infra Section I.B.
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran I), 542 U.S. 155, 173
(2004); Section I.B, infra.
11. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 539–40 (8th Cir. 2007);
see also In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 989
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that increases in American prices must proximately cause the plain-
tiff’s foreign injury); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 548, 555 (E.D.
Pa. 2010) (referring to the proximate cause analysis under the FTAIA as a “serial process” in
which the domestic effect happens first and the foreign antitrust claim comes after and be-
cause of the domestic effect).
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This hypothetical implicates two major issues in federal antitrust law:
indirect purchaser standing12 and the application of U.S. antitrust laws to
foreign conduct. Indirect purchaser standing evolved from an interpretation
of section 4 of the Clayton Act.13 Section 4 permits any “person . . . injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws” to bring suit to recover treble damages (amounting to three times ac-
tual compensatory damages) for antitrust violations.14 In Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.15 and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,16 the Su-
preme Court generally limited the definition of such persons to direct pur-
chasers, thereby denying indirect purchasers standing to sue for monetary
damages under section 4.17 American scholars and states alike have intensely
criticized this standing requirement—but it still applies to federal antitrust
claims.18 The direct purchaser rule is not absolute, however; many excep-
tions have evolved since the Court decided Illinois Brick in 1977.19 When one
of these exceptions applies, indirect purchasers may be permitted to sue.
Although there are many exceptions to the direct purchaser rule with vary-
ing degrees of judicial acceptance, this Note focuses on two that are particu-
larly relevant in the FTAIA context: (1) when a direct purchaser is owned or
controlled by its supplier (the “defendant control exception”), and (2) when
the direct purchaser conspires with its supplier in violation of antitrust laws
(the co-conspirator exception).20
While the direct purchaser rule is relatively straightforward, the interna-
tional frame of the hypothetical complicates the application of U.S. antitrust
law. Almost every product in modern America takes a transnational route to
12. This Note refers to the rule that precludes indirect purchasers from suing under
section 4 of the Clayton Act interchangeably as “indirect purchaser standing,” the “direct pur-
chaser rule,” and the “Illinois Brick doctrine” (referring to Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977)).
13. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 723–24.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
15. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
16. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See infra Section I.A for a more detailed discussion of these
cases.
17. See infra Section I.A for details regarding antitrust standing, the direct purchaser
rule, and various exceptions. Note that the direct purchaser rule does not prevent lawsuits for
injunctive relief, which are governed by a different statutory provision. 15 U.S.C. § 26.
18. See generally Christopher T. Casamassima & Tammy A. Tsoumas, The Illinois Brick
Wall: Standing Tall, Competition: J. Antitrust & Unfair Competition L. Sec. State Bar
Cal., Spring 2011, at 67, 67. Thirty-four states have passed statutes repealing Illinois Brick for
state law antitrust claims. See Michael A. Lindsay, Overview of State RPM, Antitrust Source,
Oct. 2009, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct09_
LindsayChart10_23f.authcheckdam.pdf. These state statutes are not preempted by federal law.
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
19. See infra Section I.A and Part II.
20. I discuss these exceptions in detail infra in Part II. See infra Section I.A for a discus-
sion of many additional exceptions.
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its final destination.21 Like Mono Polly’s speakers, many of these interna-
tional goods are exposed to overseas antitrust activities.22 In 1982, Congress
enacted the FTAIA to resolve uncertainties about the “scope and effect” of
U.S. antitrust laws over foreign conduct.23 The FTAIA exempts all foreign
nonimport commercial activity from the application of the antitrust laws24
unless two conditions are met: (1) the activity sufficiently impacted Ameri-
can commerce, and (2) the impact on American commerce caused the plain-
tiff’s antitrust injury.25 Courts have struggled to interpret and apply the
FTAIA, with minimal assistance from the Supreme Court.26 This complexity
is demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit’s recent opinions in Motorola Mobil-
ity LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.: after vacating its first decision, it reheard the
case and issued a second opinion, only to amend and reissue that opinion
several months later.27 On June 15, 2015, the Supreme Court denied a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari.28 The Court nevertheless seems likely to take an
FTAIA case in an upcoming term, given the inconsistency that currently
plagues the area.29 Much of this Note untangles the various interpretations
of the FTAIA.
21. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“Nothing is more common nowadays than for products imported to the United
States to include components that the producers bought from foreign manufacturers.”), cert.
denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (2015).
22. Id. (“[T]he prices of many products exported to the United States doubtless are ele-
vated . . . [by] anticompetitive acts that would be punished . . . if committed in the United
States.”).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 5–7 (1982); see Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004)
(“Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant
way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce.”).
24. The FTAIA refers specifically to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (exclusive of § 6a). 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(2012). These provisions make up the Sherman Act. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 305(a), 90 Stat. 1383, 1397 (1976).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 6a; Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 162.
26. Craig C. Corbitt & Aaron M. Sheanin, Appellate Courts Grapple with the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act—Plaintiffs’ Perspective, Competition: J. Antitrust & Un-
fair Competition L. Sec. State Bar Cal., Fall 2014, at 1, 2 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has
not parsed the FTAIA [since 2004] . . . .”); Ian Simmons & Bimal Patel, One Hundred Years of
(Attempted) Solitude: Navigating the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Antitrust,
Spring 2010, at 72, 72 (“[F]rom 1982 to 1997, no court construed the meaning of the FTAIA
. . . .”).
27. 746 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.), vacated, 773 F.3d 826 (7th Cir.), and amended by 775
F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014). I refer to the vacated decision as Motorola I and the final, amended
version of the case as Motorola II throughout this Note.
28. Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816, cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745.
29. See Corbitt & Sheanin, supra note 26, at 2 (“With all this upheaval and some incon-
sistent results, a trip to the Supreme Court—which has not parsed the FTAIA in a decade—
looks likely in the near future.” (footnote omitted)).
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The FTAIA is often invoked when foreign businesses like Computer Di-
rect make purchases from price-fixing foreign suppliers like Mono Polly.30 In
these cases, neither party is located in the United States, but effects may still
be felt in the United States (for example, by indirect purchasers)—and for-
eign businesses want to take advantage of U.S. antitrust laws. A plaintiff has
standing to sue under the FTAIA when the effects on American commerce
are substantial, and those effects cause the plaintiff’s injury.31 So under the
FTAIA, even if Computer Direct could show the Mono Polly international
cartel substantially affected American commerce, Computer Direct would
probably still lack standing because it could not demonstrate that the effects
on American commerce caused its injury.32
The Supreme Court has never addressed the convergence of indirect
purchaser standing and the FTAIA. In the hypothetical, the interaction be-
tween Illinois Brick and the FTAIA could prevent all private plaintiffs from
successfully recovering from Mono Polly in the United States, despite poten-
tially substantial domestic effects.33 Illinois Brick would block the indirect
purchasers, while the FTAIA would block Computer Direct. This interaction
undermines the deterrent effect of U.S. antitrust laws and harms American
consumers.34 Although these scenarios may be relatively rare, similar situa-
tions have occurred many times in the last fifteen years.35 Most recently, two
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have confronted this issue. One avoided the
question, and the other faced it but raised more questions than it
answered.36
Although courts would probably decline to create a new exception to
Illinois Brick just because the direct purchaser is unable to sue under the
30. See Simmons & Patel, supra note 26, at 72 (“[I]nterpretation of the FTAIA has been
most prevalent in price-fixing cases, where U.S. courts are asked to adjudicate claims by cus-
tomers who make purchases in foreign jurisdictions from foreign suppliers and where the
defendants’ alleged anticompetitive conduct occurs in a foreign market or international
commerce.”).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012); Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004) (“[Section 6a] ap-
plies if the [foreign] conduct’s domestic effect gives rise to ‘a claim.’ ” (emphasis added by
court) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000))).
32. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. See infra Section I.B for details on the
requirements of the FTAIA.
33. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 23, Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003), 2014
WL 4447001, at *23 [hereinafter Brief in Support of Neither Party] (“[A]bsent a construction
of the Illinois Brick doctrine that permits suit by the first purchaser in affected U.S. commerce,
it is possible that no one could recover damages under the federal antitrust laws despite the
tremendous harm in the United States threatened by offshore component price fixing.”).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014); Den
Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac VOF, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001); Info. Res., Inc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
36. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 816 (raising interesting questions about the interactions
with Illinois Brick exceptions); Lotes, 753 F.3d at 413 n.7 (avoiding the question).
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FTAIA,37 the question remains: When a traditional exception to Illinois Brick
would apply in the domestic context, should the indirect purchaser in the
United States be allowed to sue under the FTAIA? In Motorola Mobility LLC
v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II),38 the Seventh Circuit seemed to imply
that courts should not recognize any exceptions to Illinois Brick’s direct pur-
chaser rule in the FTAIA context.39
This Note argues that Motorola II should not be interpreted so broadly,
and the exceptions to Illinois Brick’s direct purchaser rule should apply with
equal force when the anticompetitive conduct occurs overseas.40 Part I lays
the groundwork for the subsequent discussions of the FTAIA and standing
in antitrust law. Part II argues that the defendant control and co-conspirator
exceptions to the direct purchaser rule are as valid as the textual exceptions
recognized in Illinois Brick because they satisfy Illinois Brick’s major policy
rationales. Additionally, refusing to apply these exceptions when antitrust
conduct occurs overseas effectively insulates foreign antitrust violators who
target American consumers from civil liability simply because they have
conspired with (or commanded) foreign direct purchasers to act as in-
termediaries. Part III argues that, assuming that Illinois Brick poses no bar,
courts should interpret the FTAIA to allow indirect purchaser standing and
interpret Motorola II to permit exceptions to the direct purchaser rule in the
FTAIA context.
I. Antitrust Standing Under the FTAIA
In the United States, individuals can bring lawsuits for antitrust viola-
tions only when they satisfy the requirements of antitrust standing.41 Section
4 of the Clayton Act governs private plaintiff standing for civil complainants
seeking to recover treble damages.42 When anticompetitive conduct occurs
in export or purely foreign commerce, however, plaintiffs must also satisfy
the requirements of the FTAIA. Section I.A briefly covers the federal stan-
dards for establishing private plaintiff standing in antitrust law. Section I.B
identifies the overlap between antitrust standing generally and the require-
ments under the FTAIA.
37. Research for this Note uncovered only one argument for the creation of such an
exception, in a Department of Justice (DOJ) brief to the Seventh Circuit. See Brief in Support
of Neither Party, supra note 33, at 6. In the end, however, the DOJ asked the court to recognize
the existence of the requisite effects on domestic commerce to preserve the DOJ’s prosecutorial
power under the FTAIA. Id. at 24; see Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 825. Other interpretations of the
FTAIA and Illinois Brick have also been discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg,
The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick and a Hard Place, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
785, 800 (2009).
38. 775 F.3d 816.
39. See infra Section III.B.
40. See infra Section III.B.
41. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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A. Private Plaintiff Standing in Antitrust Law
To sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, private
plaintiffs must show they have been “injured in [their] business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”43 The Supreme Court
has interpreted this language to require that plaintiffs show they suffered an
antitrust injury and are the correct “persons” to bring the suit.44
First, plaintiffs must show they sustained an “antitrust injury” that Con-
gress meant the antitrust laws to prevent.45 This injury-in-fact must also be
directly linked to the antitrust activity.46 Courts also consider the remoteness
of the claim, the speculative nature of the damages, and if denying standing
would result in major antitrust activities going “undetected or unremedied”
to determine whether the plaintiffs are the best enforcers of the antitrust
laws.47 A plaintiff must then show that the alleged antitrust violation was a
material cause of the injury.48
Private plaintiffs must also show that they are the correct “persons” to
bring the antitrust suit.49 Except in limited circumstances, the direct pur-
chaser rule prevents indirect purchasers from suing violators of antitrust
laws for treble damages.50 The Supreme Court established the direct pur-
chaser rule in two steps: Hanover Shoe51 and Illinois Brick.52 In Kansas v.
UtiliCorp United Inc., the Court reaffirmed the doctrine.53
Hanover Shoe established the principle that antitrust defendants cannot
strip direct purchasers of standing by showing that a direct purchaser has
passed on the overcharge to indirect purchasers.54 When anticompetitive
conditions increase prices for direct purchasers, direct purchasers often pass
on at least some of the cost to their own customers.55 In Hanover Shoe, the
43. Id. § 15(a).
44. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540–44; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).
45. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540; see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1977) (noting that to recover under 15 U.S.C. § 7,
the plaintiffs had to show more than injury resulting from an illegal presence in the
marketplace).
46. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540–42; see also Steamfitters Local Union No.
420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 928–29 (3d Cir. 1999).
47. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540–42.
48. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (limiting private suits to persons who have been injured in
their business or property).
50. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977); see also Crane, supra note 1, at
174.
51. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
52. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
53. 497 U.S. 199, 204 (1990).
54. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494; see also Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199,
206–07 (1990); Crane, supra note 1, at 171.
55. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a description of how the pass-on effect
fits in with the motivating hypothetical. Although indirect purchasers are ultimately harmed
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plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had “monopolized the shoe machinery
industry” in violation of the antitrust laws.56 The defendants, however, tried
to use a “ ‘passing-on’ defense” and claimed that the plaintiff “suffered no
legally cognizable injury . . . [because] the illegal overcharge . . . was reflected
in the price charged for shoes” that were sold by the plaintiff.57 The Supreme
Court rejected this defense in part due to the complexity of determining the
various causes of price changes and the impact those changes have on sales.58
The Court also considered the absence of incentives for “ultimate consum-
ers” to bring antitrust class action lawsuits: direct purchasers with more
money at stake could more efficiently enforce the antitrust laws.59
Illinois Brick expanded the holding in Hanover Shoe, generally prohibit-
ing the use of the pass-on theory to establish indirect purchaser standing.60
In Illinois Brick the plaintiffs (the state of Illinois and others) were “indirect
purchasers of concrete block” from the defendant.61 The defendant had sold
concrete to masonry contractors, who submitted bids to general contractors
that in turn served the plaintiffs.62 The plaintiffs argued they had standing
because the direct purchasers (the various contractors) had passed on the
overcharge, injuring them.63 Although the Court recognized that the plain-
tiffs might have been harmed, the Court held that Hanover Shoe limited
standing to direct purchasers who had been overcharged, excluding others in
manufacturing or the distribution chain,64 on the basis of three fundamental
policy concerns. First, allowing indirect purchasers to recover would create a
“serious risk of multiple liability for defendants,” given that the rule in Han-
over Shoe would let the direct purchaser sue as well.65 Second, calculating the
distribution of the overcharge through the supply chain would overly
complicate “already protracted treble-damages proceedings.”66 Finally,
by pass-on effects, other policy considerations led the Supreme Court to reject a pass-on the-
ory of antitrust standing in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 492–94;
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745–47.
56. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483.
57. Id. at 487–88.
58. Id. at 492–94.
59. Id. at 494.
60. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 728.
61. Id. at 726.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 726–27.
64. Id. at 728 n.7, 729.
65. Id. at 730.
66. Id. at 732; see also Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir.
1998) (“Precisely what part of the overcharge will be borne by the direct purchaser, and what
part will be borne by the indirect purchaser, is ‘an example of what is called incidence analysis,
and is famously difficult.’ ” (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123
F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997))).
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permitting direct purchasers to recover the full amount of the overcharge
would optimally motivate direct purchasers to enforce the antitrust laws.67
Most recently, Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc. reaffirmed the Court’s
commitment to the Illinois Brick doctrine.68 In UtiliCorp, the defendants al-
legedly conspired to increase the price of gas supplied to utility companies.69
The utilities (the direct purchasers) then sold the gas to their customers (the
indirect purchasers) in several states.70 The states asserted parens patriae
claims on behalf of those customers.71 The Court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing; the plaintiffs’ claims implicated the same policy concerns as
those emphasized in Illinois Brick because the plaintiff states represented in-
direct purchasers.72 The Court soundly rejected the idea of creating market-
based exceptions to the direct purchaser rule.73
Although the UtiliCorp Court declined to create a new exception, Illinois
Brick explicitly mentioned two exceptions: the cost-plus contracts exception
and the own-or-control exception.74 The cost-plus exception established by
Hanover Shoe and confirmed by Illinois Brick allows indirect purchasers to
sue when there is a pre-existing cost-plus contract between the direct and
indirect purchasers.75 A cost-plus contract fixes the quantity of sales so the
direct purchaser is “insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of
attempting to pass on the overcharge,” simplifying the apportionment of
damages.76 UtiliCorp described this exception as applying to situations in
which “market forces” are suspended.77
A second exception mentioned in Illinois Brick allows the pass-on theory
to be used “where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its cus-
tomer.”78 When the indirect purchaser and the direct purchaser act as a sin-
gle entity, courts grant indirect purchasers standing because it preserves “an
undiluted incentive in the hands of the most likely enforcer” of the antitrust
laws.79 If an employee directly purchases an overcharged product and is sub-
sequently reimbursed by her employer (the indirect purchaser), the direct
67. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 735 (“[A]ntitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers . . . .”).
68. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 204 (1990).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 204–05.
71. Id. at 204.
72. Id. at 204–13.
73. Id. at 216–17 (“In sum, even assuming that any economic assumptions underlying
the Illinois Brick rule might be disproved in a specific case, we think it an unwarranted and
counterproductive exercise to litigate a series of exceptions.”).
74. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 n.12, 736 n.16 (1977).
75. Id. at 732 n.12.
76. Id. at 736; see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218, 225 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (affirming the Illinois Brick exceptions).
77. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 218.
78. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
79. Matthew M. Duffy, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Excep-
tions to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1709, 1733 (2012).
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purchaser “retain[s] no independent harm.”80 This avoids the policy
problems of concern in Illinois Brick.
Other exceptions have arisen either from unquestioning judicial consen-
sus or from the logical implications of the own-or-control exception.81
Meanwhile, suits for injunctive relief and criminal charges fall outside of the
purview of section 4 of the Clayton Act because they are not brought by
parties seeking treble damages, thereby bypassing concerns about duplicative
monetary recovery and complex damage calculations, since no damages are
sought or awarded.82 Outside of these well-established exceptions, the crea-
tion of a “new” exception is a rare occurrence.83 This Note addresses
whether and how these exceptions should apply in the FTAIA context.
B. The FTAIA: Interpretation and Controversy
The FTAIA sets a “general rule placing all (nonimport) activity involv-
ing foreign commerce outside” the reach of the antitrust laws,84 and then
makes an exception for when “the conduct both (1) sufficiently affects
American commerce . . . and (2) has an effect of a kind that the antitrust law
considers harmful, i.e., the effect must ‘giv[e] rise to a [Sherman Act]
claim.’ ”85 The notoriously vague language in the statute has created several
circuit splits and interpretive challenges.86 This Section explains interpreta-
tions of the FTAIA that implicate the Illinois Brick doctrine and determine
the application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct.
80. Id. at 1733–34; cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984) (holding that a corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiary cannot “agree” for
purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
81. The express assignment exception, when direct purchasers assign their rights to sue
to indirect purchasers, is unquestioned. See Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aero-
space Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 438–39 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant-control exception was also
widely accepted almost immediately after Illinois Brick. See, e.g., In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust
Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978). See infra Part II for a deeper analysis of the defendant-
control exception.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (governing private injunctive suits); Minn-Chem, Inc. v.
Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“If this were an action by the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, we would not need to worry about
Illinois Brick . . . .”).
83. See infra Part II for a discussion of the development and purposes of the “co-con-
spirator” exception.
84. Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2004)). The FTAIA
applies to claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (exclusive of § 6a). 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(2012).
85. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 162 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)).
86. See Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 285, 329 (2007). One such controversy—whether the
FTAIA is jurisdictional or substantive—was arguably resolved by the Court’s holding in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co.,
753 F.3d 395, 406 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that every court since Arbaugh has held the statute
non-jurisdictional). This issue is outside the scope of this Note.
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Foreign conduct falls within the Sherman Act when it involves import
commerce or when it falls under the FTAIA’s “effects exception.”87 As the
FTAIA states, “[the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade
or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign
nations.”88 This import exception applies “when a foreign cartel fixes the
price of goods sold directly to U.S. customers”89 and when the antitrust vio-
lators “target import goods or services.”90 In addition to falling outside of
the FTAIA’s restrictions, the people and businesses in the United States that
directly import the goods will also generally have standing under Illinois
Brick as direct purchasers. When the conduct involves export or foreign
commerce, the more complicated “effects exception” determines if the plain-
tiff’s claim is reachable under the FTAIA and Sherman Act.91 The effects
exception requires a cognizable antitrust violation with “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable” domestic effects (the “effects test”), and a plain-
tiff whose injury was caused by the domestic effects (the “causation
element”).92
Congress designed the FTAIA to strike a balance between protecting
commerce and consumers while “avoiding unreasonable interference with
the regulation of foreign markets by other countries” in respect of comity.93
In the FTAIA context, comity is “not the comity of courts, whereby judges
decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged
elsewhere, but rather what might be termed ‘prescriptive comity’: the respect
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.”94 In
adjudicating FTAIA claims, courts may consider the goodwill and respect
concerns implicated by international comity.95 Perhaps they should—apply-
ing antitrust laws to foreign conduct risks “interfere[nce] with a foreign na-
tion’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.”96 For
example, in the hypothetical, Computer Direct’s home country made a pol-
icy choice against the award of civil damages for antitrust violations.97 Per-
haps, in deciding to base its business there, Computer Direct sought to
87. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
88. Id.
89. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in
Support of Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 8, Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-8003), 2014 WL 1878995, at *8 [hereinafter Brief in Support of Rehearing]; see
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
90. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2011);
see Brief in Support of Neither Party, supra note 33, at 8–9.
91. Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 8.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 6a; Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2004).
93. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Motorola II, 775 F.3d
816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief].
94. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 798 (majority opinion).
96. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 165.
97. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[F]oreign antitrust laws rarely
authorize private damages actions.”), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (2015).
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benefit from the very policies that failed to protect it from Mono Polly. In
Motorola II for example, several nations filed amicus briefs with the Seventh
Circuit, expressing “worr[y] about the implications of Motorola’s suit for
their own competition policies.”98
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that the FTAIA’s relative in-
fringement on foreign sovereigns is “nonetheless reasonable, and hence con-
sistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as [it] reflect[s] a
legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury” caused by anticompeti-
tive foreign conduct.99 Considering that foreign governments may benefit
from cartels based in their own countries that export the price-fixed goods,
they “often have no incentive” to punish such antitrust activity.100 Courts
do, however, still consider comity when interpreting and applying the
FTAIA.101
The FTAIA generally avoids implicating comity concerns by requiring
that foreign antitrust activity create “direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect[s]” on American commerce in order to fall within the Sher-
man Act.102 There are currently two interpretations of the requirement that
the effects be “direct” under the FTAIA: the Ninth Circuit’s immediate con-
sequence test, and the competing “reasonably proximate causal nexus” inter-
pretation.103 These interpretations have significant ramifications for private
individuals suing for treble damages and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
bringing injunctive and criminal charges.104 The inquiries into substantiality
and reasonable foreseeability are separate from directness; effects can be di-
rect and still fail the substantiality or reasonable foreseeability prongs. Al-
though federal circuit courts have not explicitly disagreed about what makes
an effect “substantial,” they have also not offered any definite tests.105 Sub-
stantiality may require injuries to a market rather than to individuals, or it
may be indicated by the monetary size of the injury.106 The DOJ has, for
example, used the volume of sales that were impacted to determine substan-
tiality: “billions of dollars of affected commerce” would be enough to show
98. Id. at 817.
99. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 165.
100. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
101. See, e.g., Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 824–25. See infra Section III.B for a deeper discus-
sion of the implications of comity for FTAIA purposes relating to Motorola II.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444
(2d Cir. 1945) (“[A] statute should not be interpreted to cover acts abroad which have no
consequence here.”).
103. See infra Section III.A.
104. See infra Section III.A.
105. Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Anti-
trust Law: What is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 11, 18 (2003).
106. See id.
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substantial impact.107 The test for foreseeability seems less contested—the
effects should be measured by an objective standard.108
Although courts and scholars continue to debate the proper interpreta-
tion of the effects test, the Supreme Court has helpfully clarified the “give[ ]
rise to a claim” causation element of the FTAIA.109 In F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran I), the plaintiff was an entirely foreign
actor with an injury occurring outside the United States.110 The plaintiff
claimed that it should be permitted to sue under the FTAIA’s effects excep-
tion because (1) the foreign anticompetitive conduct satisfied the effects test,
and (2) the substantial effects in the United States gave rise to a claim under
the Sherman Act.111 This interpretation would have permitted the plaintiff to
sue using the effects exception to the FTAIA even though it was not injured
by the effects in the United States.  In Empagran I, however, the Court held
that “ ‘gives rise to a claim’ means ‘gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim.’ ”112 The
Court based its decision on the premise that “Congress would not have in-
tended the FTAIA’s exception to bring independently caused foreign injury
within the Sherman Act’s reach.”113 This interpretation limited the scope of
the FTAIA to claims that were sufficiently related to adverse effects on Amer-
ican commerce, taking into account the importance of “comity and his-
tory.”114 Every circuit court that has considered cases after Empagran I has
decided that the domestic effects must proximately cause the plaintiff’s
injury.115
When foreign direct purchasers fail Empagran I’s causation test, Ameri-
can indirect purchasers could still theoretically qualify to bring suit under
the FTAIA’s effects exception.116 The direct purchaser rule may stand in their
way, however.117 The remainder of this Note argues that exceptions to the
direct purchaser rule that satisfy all the policy concerns of Illinois Brick
should apply with equal force in both domestic and international cases.
107. Brief in Support of Neither Party, supra note 33, at 12.
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012); see Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 173–74 (2004).
110. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 163–65.
111. Id. at 160.
112. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 414 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 173).
113. Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 173.
114. Id. at 174.
115. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 414 (agreeing with the Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits); see In re
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008);
In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2007); Empagran
S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
116. Assuming that the effects test is met, American indirect purchasers who are harmed
by the anticompetitive conduct in the United States can likely show that their harm is proxi-
mately caused by the adverse effect on American commerce. There is debate, however, about
whether indirect purchasers can ever suffer direct effects. See infra Section III.A.
117. See infra Part III for the argument that the Illinois Brick doctrine applies in full to
FTAIA cases.
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II. Controllers, Co-Conspirators, and Calming
Illinois Brick Concerns
In the hypothetical at the start of this Note, Computer Direct was a
victim of international price fixing—but what if it had been an accomplice?
Although UtiliCorp seemingly disfavors new exceptions,118 lower courts have
created exceptions to the direct purchaser rule to deal with situations in
which the direct purchaser is in cahoots with the antitrust violator.
This Part focuses on the exceptions permitting indirect purchasers to
sue when (1) the direct purchaser is a co-conspirator (the “co-conspirator
exception”), or (2) the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by the anti-
trust violator (the “defendant control exception”).119 Essentially, this Note
argues that the defendant control and the co-conspirator exceptions should
be considered equal to the exceptions explicitly mentioned in Illinois Brick—
the traditional own-or-control exception and the cost-plus exception—
when determining which should apply in the FTAIA context.120 The defen-
dant control and co-conspirator exceptions have particular relevance in the
FTAIA context. Ordinarily, foreign antitrust violators that sell products di-
rectly into the United States are subject to U.S. antitrust laws under either
the FTAIA’s import commerce exception or effects exception (because they
satisfy Illinois Brick).121 Foreign antitrust violators that target American con-
sumers should not be able to get around this liability simply by conspiring
with (or commanding) foreign direct purchases to act as intermediaries.
One way to close this loophole is to recognize the defendant control and co-
conspirator exceptions in the FTAIA context.
Section II.A analyzes the development and distinctive features of the
defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions. Section II.B argues that
these two exceptions arose because they satisfied Illinois Brick’s concerns of
prohibiting duplicative liability, encouraging efficient enforcement of the
antitrust laws, and avoiding overly complex proceedings. All exceptions that
satisfy these concerns should apply with equal force in the United States and
in the FTAIA context.
A. Exceptional Definitions: Two as One
The Supreme Court has never officially recognized the defendant con-
trol exception or the co-conspirator exception.122 Still, they both developed
118. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 479 U.S. 199, 219 (1990).
119. See In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981); see
also In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001) (“It is also
well-established that the rationale of Illinois Brick’s bar to indirect purchaser suits does not
apply where the supposed intermediary is controlled by one or the other of the parties.”).
120. See supra Section I.A (describing these exceptions).
121. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
122. The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari to cases that recognize these
exceptions. E.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th
Cir. 1997) (discussing the defendant control exception), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998); In
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from the intuitive notion that when the direct purchaser conspires with (or
is owned or controlled by) the antitrust violator, the so-called “indirect”
purchaser is really buying directly from a single conspiring entity made up of
the direct purchaser and the original violator.123 These are persuasive and
intuitive exceptions that should be recognized as authoritative and should
apply in the FTAIA context.
Within three years of Illinois Brick, at least two circuits recognized that
the “own-or-control” exception should apply when the antitrust violators
control the direct purchasers, creating the defendant control exception.124
The original own-or-control exception applies when the direct and indirect
purchasers function as one entity, and the defendant control exception ap-
plies when the direct purchaser and the supplier function as one entity.
When applying the own-or-control exception, “the unanimous view is that
the exception applies not only where the direct purchaser is owned or con-
trolled by its customer, but also where it is owned or controlled by its sup-
plier.”125 This exception is different from the co-conspirator exception,126 but
similarly permits indirect purchasers to sue when “there is no realistic possi-
bility that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust
violation.”127
The “more contentious” co-conspirator exception128 comes in two
forms. The indirect purchaser can sue the co-conspirators in either a tradi-
tional horizontal conspiracy or, relevant here, in a vertical conspiracy.129 A
vertical conspiracy is one in which the two sides of a conspiracy “operate at
different levels of production or distribution,” such as a supplier and its
customer.130 The vertical co-conspirator exception “is not really an exception
at all” because “[i]f the direct purchaser conspires to fix the price paid by the
plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs pay the fixed price directly and are not indirect
re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 530–32 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that
some courts within the Ninth Circuit recognize the co-conspirator exception), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 924 (1984).
123. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012).
124. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 497 F.
Supp. 218, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (citing Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d
323 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978)).
125. In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981); see also
In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001) (“It is also well-
established that the rationale of Illinois Brick’s bar to indirect purchaser suits does not apply
where the supposed intermediary is controlled by one or the other of the parties.”).
126. Casamassima & Tsoumas, supra note 18, at 69–70, 73; Duffy, supra note 79, at 1734,
1742.
127. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980)).
128. Duffy, supra note 79, at 1734.
129. See Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980);
Jerome Musheno, Note, Should Standing Be an Issue for the Indirect Purchaser in a Vertical
Conspiracy?, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 251, 267 (1999). The horizontal co-conspirator exception is
more contentious, and is outside the scope of this Note.
130. Crane, supra note 1, at 18.
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purchasers (that is, there is no pass-on theory involved).”131 The Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona first recognized the vertical co-con-
spirator exception in 1977, the same year the Court decided Illinois Brick.132
Since then, many courts have held that the alleged co-conspirator must be
named and joined in the lawsuit for the exception to apply, in order to
reduce the risk of duplicative recovery.133 If both co-conspirators were not
joined, then “inconsistent adjudications on the existence of a vertical con-
spiracy would enable both indirect purchasers and middlemen to recover for
a single overcharge.”134
B. Exceptional Policies: Applying Illinois Brick
The Court recognized two explicit exceptions in Hanover Shoe and Illi-
nois Brick (the cost-plus and own-or-control exceptions) because they satis-
fied the three policy concerns implicated when indirect purchasers are
permitted to sue for treble damages in antitrust lawsuits.135 When applying
or creating any exception to Illinois Brick, courts usually reference more than
one of these policy reasons and often discuss all three: prohibiting duplica-
tive liability, encouraging efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws, and
avoiding overly complex proceedings.136 The defendant control and co-con-
spirator exceptions are no different. U.S. courts applying the defendant con-
trol and co-conspirator exceptions justify their application by reference to
the policy considerations in Illinois Brick.137 Even though federal courts
131. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012); see also M.E.,
Recent Developments, Price Fixing—Proving Injury Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act by Indi-
rect Purchasers Relaxed by Expansion of Exceptions to Illinois Brick, 60 Wash. U. L.Q. 716, 721
(1982).
132. See Gas-A-Tron of Ariz. v. Am. Oil Co., No. CIV 73-191-TUC-WCF, 1977 WL 1519,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 1977); M.E., supra note 131, at 720.
133. See, e.g., Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 931 (3d Cir. 1986); In
re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 530–33 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Coordi-
nated Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir.
1982). But see Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1980)
(requiring only the naming of the co-conspirators in the complaint); Gas-A-Tron, 1977 WL
1519, at *1.
134. M.E., supra note 131, at 721 (citing In re Beef Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.
1979)).
135. See supra Section I.A for a discussion of these exceptions. Because the Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized these exceptions to the direct purchaser rule, it is not necessary
to justify them here. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 n.12, 736 n.16 (1977).
136. E.g., Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 1984); In re
Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366–67 (D.N.J. 2001); In re Mid-Atl.
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1295–96 (D. Md. 1981).
137. See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (basing its
analysis on the inapplicability of the reasons from Illinois Brick without any specific exception
to rely on); Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at 1213 (establishing the co-conspirator exception based
on Illinois Brick policy).
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widely apply these exceptions, the Supreme Court has never explicitly con-
sidered them.138 This Section explains why these exceptions nevertheless as-
suage the Supreme Court’s concerns from Illinois Brick.
First, both the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions are in-
tended to avoid liability of multiple defendants for treble damages, one of
the primary policy concerns of Illinois Brick.139 The defendant control excep-
tion and co-conspirator exception leave a small possibility that the con-
trolled direct purchaser or co-conspirator will eventually bring a suit against
the supplier, although many courts have argued that the multiple recovery
consideration is fully addressed in the co-conspirator exception.140 In Royal
Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the Ninth Circuit admitted that there
would be a chance of duplicative recovery under the co-conspirator excep-
tion but was not overly concerned because it was unlikely.141 In applying
these exceptions, courts have taken steps to minimize the chances for dupli-
cative recovery. For example, courts have held that clear ownership in the
form of a subsidiary relationship or clear actual control as indicated by
credit or stock arrangements are the only acceptable circumstances in which
to invoke the defendant control exception,142 and many have required the
conspiring direct purchaser to be joined as a defendant before applying the
co-conspirator exception.143 Joining the co-conspirator (direct purchaser) as
a defendant prevents the direct purchaser from bringing a separate suit to
try to clear its name and recover damages later on.
The co-conspirator and the defendant control exceptions are most effec-
tive at encouraging the efficient enforcement of antitrust laws. If there is
little chance of duplicative recovery because the direct purchaser is unlikely
to sue, then there is also the chance that “barring [the indirect purchaser’s]
suit would close off every avenue for private enforcement of the antitrust
laws in such cases,” which would be “intolerable.”144 Without the defendant
control and co-conspirator exceptions, antitrust violators could avoid liabil-
ity by creating a subsidiary or otherwise controlled “middleman” to take the
fall for them, thereby preventing indirect purchasers from bringing suit.145
138. See supra note 122.
139. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474–75 (1982); Musheno, supra
note 129, at 267.
140. Compare In re Mid-Atl. Toyota, 516 F. Supp. at 1295–96 (“[T]he risk of duplicative
liability is negligible in that the dealer defendants would be foreclosed from recovery . . . .”),
with Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 372 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding there was no risk of duplicative recovery or inconsistent judgments), and Merican,
Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 969 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that the risk of
duplicative recovery precluded the application of the co-conspirator exception).
141. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980) (“But
because as a practical matter the chance of a direct-purchaser suit is so small, the correspond-
ingly small risk of multiple recovery does not disturb us.”).
142. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1162 (5th Cir. 1979).
143. See supra note 133.
144. Royal Printing Co., 621 F.2d at 327.
145. Id. at 326; In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978).
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These subsidiaries or co-conspirators would not be inclined to bring anti-
trust actions against their controllers or conspirators, thereby insulating
those that would otherwise be held liable for antitrust violations.
Both the defendant control exception and the co-conspirator exception
generally avoid the problems associated with overly complex “incidence
analysis”146—or tracing the path of the overcharge—that is, determining
how much of the overcharge was passed on through the distribution chain.
In both instances, because the direct purchaser and the antitrust violator are
acting as one entity, it should be easy to show that the entire overcharge was
passed to the indirect purchaser. In co-conspirator cases, the price has been
preset so the co-conspirator does not incur additional supply-and-demand
costs from passing on the costs to customers.147 This means that the calcula-
tions for apportionment are simple: the non-conspirator is the only party
that has suffered harm and the pass-on theory is inapplicable. In cases in
which the middleman is owned or controlled by the initial seller, the same is
likely to be true.
Although satisfying all three Illinois Brick considerations is important
for a viable exception, avoiding overly complex antitrust proceedings is vital.
Illinois Brick suggests that avoiding complexity is the most important con-
sideration: even if all parties could be joined to eliminate duplicative recov-
eries, “the complexity thereby introduced into treble-damages proceedings
argues strongly for retaining the Hanover Shoe rule.”148 Accordingly, avoid-
ing complex apportionment is “the most persuasive”149 policy consideration.
Based on an analysis of the various exceptions, avoiding complex apportion-
ment may be possible only when two of the parties act as a single entity or
when there is a clear cost-plus contract explicitly demonstrating that the
direct purchaser did not suffer any losses from lost sales.
Since Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have
declined to create new or expanded exceptions to the direct purchaser rule,
particularly when an exception would unduly complicate proceedings and
apportionment.150 Even if an exception aligns with the Illinois Brick policies,
UtiliCorp makes clear that although the “economic assumptions underlying
the Illinois Brick rule might be disproved in a specific case,” it is an “unwar-
ranted and counterproductive exercise to litigate a series of exceptions.”151
146. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir.
1997) (“Tracing a price hike through successive resales is an example of what is called ‘inci-
dence analysis,’ and is famously difficult.”).
147. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012).
148. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731 n.11 (1977).
149. In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (D. Md. 1981).
150. See e.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 210 (1990) (“If we were to add
indirect purchasers to the action, we would have to devise an apportionment formula. This is
the very complexity that Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick sought to avoid.”); Gulfstream III
Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 439–40 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to
expand an exception because of complexities in apportioning losses).
151. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 217.
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Courts have, however, interpreted Illinois Brick’s exceptions to be nonexclu-
sive.152 The dissenting opinion in UtiliCorp advocates for creating an excep-
tion in cases in which the policy rationales of Illinois Brick are satisfied.153
The defendant control exception and the co-conspirator exception are rela-
tively well-established and satisfy the policy rationales of Illinois Brick. Ac-
cordingly, like the exceptions mentioned in Illinois Brick, they should apply
with equal force to domestic and international anticompetitive conduct.
III. The Application of Illinois Brick Exceptions
Under the FTAIA
Although the FTAIA does not mention the direct purchaser rule, it
seems clear that the basic Illinois Brick rule applies in the FTAIA context.154
The question remains, however, whether and how the exceptions to the Illi-
nois Brick doctrine may apply. Section III.A advocates for interpreting “di-
rect” effects under the FTAIA to require a reasonably proximate causal
nexus, particularly given that standard’s effects on the criminal deterrence of
foreign cartels. Section III.B analyzes the recent Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU
Optronics Corp. decision. Section III.C concludes that, because the policy
concerns are not fundamentally different when the direct purchaser happens
to be located overseas, the exceptions that satisfy all of Illinois Brick’s con-
cerns should be applied with equal force when there is a foreign direct pur-
chaser in the FTAIA context.
A. “Directly” Interpreting the FTAIA
In interpreting “direct” under the FTAIA, the Ninth Circuit required
that direct effects “follow[ ] as an immediate consequence” of anticompeti-
tive conduct, meaning only direct purchasers can experience direct effects
under the FTAIA.155 This parallelism has tempted several courts.156 The Sev-
enth and Second Circuits, however, have opted for the more flexible “rea-
sonably proximate causal nexus” interpretation of “direct.”157 Under this
standard, causal connections that are “so attenuated that the consequence is
152. See Mid-Atl. Toyota, 516 F. Supp. at 1292 (“Analysis of the policy considerations
underlying Illinois Brick reveals quite clearly that the exceptions therein announced were not
meant to be necessarily exclusive.”); see also UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 219 (White, J., dissenting)
(“Illinois Brick did not hold that, in all circumstances, indirect purchasers lack § 4 standing.”).
153. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 219–24 (White, J., dissenting).
154. Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2014) (indicating that Motorola’s attempts to
argue otherwise are unsupported), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (2015).
155. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).
156. See Motorola I, 746 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.), vacated, 773 F.3d 826 (7th Cir.), and
amended by 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014); Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[The plaintiff’s] injury, while real, is derivative of the
injury suffered by its foreign joint ventures and subsidiaries . . . and [does] not give it antitrust
standing.”).
157. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 410 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
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more aptly described as mere fortuity” would be indirect.158 Applying this
analysis, it is possible for an indirect purchaser to suffer direct effects.159 This
interpretation would therefore permit indirect purchasers to have standing
to sue under the FTAIA, assuming that they can get around Illinois Brick.
This test is similar to a proximate cause analysis; it can involve inquiring into
the natural and probable consequences of an act, the scope of the risk of the
anticompetitive activity, or whether there was a superseding cause.160
Under the direct means direct theory of the FTAIA, antitrust claims
would be impossible “for [the] price fixing of products [first] sold abroad,
no matter how massively and predictably U.S. consumers were harmed.”161
This interpretation could have disastrous effects, however, because the
FTAIA applies equally to private civil cases and the criminal prosecution of
international cartels.162 Normally, because Illinois Brick applies only to suits
brought for treble damages under the Clayton Act, the DOJ has no standing
issues. This definition, however, would create one by tying the direct pur-
chaser doctrine to the FTAIA requirement for direct effects.163 If the FTAIA
limits direct effects to first purchasers, the DOJ would be powerless against
foreign anticompetitive conduct that had a substantial effect on American
indirect purchasers.164 Although the Supreme Court has not considered the
extent of DOJ jurisdiction in international cases, the First Circuit has held
that the DOJ may prosecute foreign entities when their activities have a
“substantial and intended effect within the United States,” mirroring the
FTAIA.165
Also, the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that direct effects “follow[ ] as an
immediate consequence” of anticompetitive conduct166 seems to exclude any
indirect purchaser claims and, perhaps, related DOJ claims because it would
mean that two steps removed from the initial source might be too remote.
No other circuits have followed this standard. This Section argues for a more
flexible definition of “direct” in direct effects—one that is different from the
definition in direct purchaser.
158. Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 9 (quoting Paroline v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2014)).
159. See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 399–401 (3d Cir. 2000).
160. Brief in Support of Neither Party, supra note 33, at 6, 13–14 (citing Lotes, 753 F.3d at
412).
161. Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 2; see also Motorola I, 746 F.3d at
844.
162. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(“[R]egardless of whether the case is brought by the government or in private litigation, it is
essential to meet the criteria spelled out by the FTAIA.”).
163. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 540 (1983).
164. See Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 10.
165. Developments in the Law, Extraterritoriality: Comity and Extraterritoriality in Anti-
trust Enforcement, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1269, 1274 (2011) (quoting United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)).
166. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Courts should interpret “direct” in the FTAIA as requiring only “a rea-
sonably proximate causal nexus” to the anticompetitive activity.167 The text
of the statute, its purpose, and the practical impact on the DOJ favor the
reasonably proximate causal nexus standard.
The reasonably proximate causal nexus standard is a better textual un-
derstanding of the FTAIA because it “gives effect” to all parts of the statute
and accordingly avoids rendering much of the FTAIA superfluous.168 The
statutory interpretation rule against surplusage arises out of a court’s “duty
to give effect, where possible, to every word of a statute.”169 To interpret
“direct” to mean “immediate” would violate the rule against surplusage in
two ways. First, “[r]eading ‘direct’ as ‘immediate’ would rob the separate
‘reasonabl[e] foreseeab[ility]’ requirement of any meaningful function, since
[it is difficult] . . . to imagine any domestic effect that would be both ‘imme-
diate’ and ‘substantial’ but not ‘reasonably foreseeable.’ ”170 Second, de-
manding an “ ‘immediate’ consequence on import or domestic commerce
comes close to ignoring the fact that straightforward import commerce has
already been excluded from the FTAIA’s coverage.”171 It would make the
import exception “superfluous[ ] . . . or insignificant” since it already covers
the instances in which Americans are the direct purchasers.172 “Superimpos-
ing the idea of ‘immediate consequence’ on top of the full phrase results in a
stricter test than the complete text of the statute can bear.”173
Although unified definitions of “direct” in the two contexts are appeal-
ing, the definitions may diverge for several reasons. Arguably, because they
are both used in the same area of the law, they should be interpreted with
the same meaning by analogy to the tendency of courts to read different
related statutes as if they were one law (in pari materia). This canon of statu-
tory interpretation reflects the assumption that “a legislative body generally
uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context” across
various statutes.174 That analogy, however, overlooks the key fact that the
direct purchaser rule is not a statute. It is a common law doctrine developed
by the Supreme Court before the passage of the FTAIA. Although Congress
167. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 410 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857).
168. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2248 (2011) (“[T]he canon against
superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word
of a statute.” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
169. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 167 (2001).
170. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 411 (alterations in original).
171. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
172. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174); see
Supplemental Brief, supra note 93, at 4 (“[I]t would reach only conduct that involves import
commerce and is, thus, excluded from [the FTAIA’s] limitations entirely.”); Corbitt & Sheanin,
supra note 26, at 8–9.
173. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857.
174. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972).
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was presumably aware of Illinois Brick,175 Congress’s complete failure to
mention the direct purchaser rule in the text of the FTAIA indicates that it
may not have been thinking of the potential dual meaning of “direct” in that
context.
Additionally, the use of “direct” in each instance is fundamentally dif-
ferent. In “direct purchaser,” “direct” refers to the relationship between the
purchaser and the seller, not the relationship between the injury and the
anticompetitive conduct. Although “remote” can be used to describe either
effects with loose causal connections or the distance of several degrees, “re-
mote” need not have the same meaning in both instances. Merely traveling
through one additional link in the distribution chain, absent other consider-
ations, should not transform direct causal effects into indirect ones.176 In a
price-fixing scenario, it is difficult to imagine a complete pass on of an over-
charge from the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser resulting in any-
thing other than a direct effect.177 Even when the price fixing occurs on a
component part, it could still cause “significant harm in the downstream
consumer markets.”178 Even Illinois Brick recognizes that preventing indirect
purchasers from suing will deny recovery to indirect purchasers who may
have been “actually injured by antitrust violations.”179 Being actually injured
by something indicates direct causation. There is “nothing inherent in the
nature of . . . international supply chains” that would “render any and all
domestic effects impermissibly remote and indirect.”180
Given that there are two distinct definitions of “direct” in the diction-
ary, Congress could easily have applied one in the FTAIA context, while the
Court applied the other in developing the direct purchaser rule. Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary defines “direct” as both (1) “proceeding
from one point to another in time or space without deviation or interrup-
tion,” and (2) “characterized by or giving evidence of a close especially logi-
cal, causal, or consequential relationship.”181 The fact that United States v.
LSL Biotechnologies relied on the first definition for the immediate conse-
quence test182 and the courts in Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.
and Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. relied on the second, citing Webster’s
Third, indicates that both are judicially accepted definitions of “direct.”183
175. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 11 (1982) (citing Illinois Brick as an example of ways
that antitrust standing is limited under section 4 of the Clayton Act—but making no reference
to the direct purchaser rule or how it should fit in with the FTAIA).
176. Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 9 (“[T]he existence of several steps in
the causal chain does not alone render an effect indirect or too remote.”).
177. See Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 105, at 19.
178. Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 11.
179. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
180. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2014).
181. Id. at 410 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 640 (1981)).
182. 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).
183. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 410; Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir.
2012) (en banc).
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The second definition “is more consistent with the language of the statute”
and “addresses the classic concern about remoteness” through a proximate
cause analysis and should be adopted for the FTAIA’s effects exception.184
Congressional intent also indicates that courts should not interpret the
statute so narrowly. Although Congress recognized that the FTAIA impli-
cated international comity concerns, “Congress’ foremost concern in passing
the antitrust laws was the protection of Americans.”185 James Atwood, for-
mer deputy legal advisor of the U.S. Department of State, informed Con-
gress that “it is simply too important from the standpoint of American
interests” to abandon the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws when there are
adverse effects within the United States.186 The FTAIA was “not intended to
restrict the application of American laws to extraterritorial conduct where
the requisite effects exist.”187 Additionally, Congress meant to “preserve[ ]
antitrust protections in the domestic marketplace for all purchasers.”188 Sub-
stantial and predictable anticompetitive effects on American markets are ad-
verse whether they occur to direct or indirect purchasers, and limiting the
definition of direct would undermine the purpose of the FTAIA to balance
these concerns.189
Interpreting “direct” to apply only to purchases by direct purchasers in
the United States “risks constraining the government’s ability to prosecute
offshore component price fixing that threatens massive harm to U.S. com-
merce and consumers.”190 In the modern world, this would make the Ameri-
can marketplace unacceptably vulnerable to exploitation.191 It is not difficult
to imagine a situation in which an overseas price fixer increases prices for its
direct purchaser (also overseas), who then passes on the entire amount to
consumers in the United States. In such a case, the overseas direct purchaser
might fail to show that substantial, reasonably foreseeable effects on Ameri-
can commerce gave rise to its claim, precluding it from suing under the
FTAIA.192 In this situation, even if indirect purchasers are not permitted to
184. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857; Brief in Support of Rehearing, supra note 89, at 8.
185. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978).
186. Supplemental Brief, supra note 93, at 5 n.3 (quoting Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act: Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 86, 92 (1981) (statement of James R. Atwood,
former Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State)).
187. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 13 (1982).
188. Id. at 10.
189. See Supplemental Brief, supra note 93, at 1.
190. Brief in Support of Neither Party, supra note 33, at 6.
191. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 413 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“[W]e expect that some perpetrators will design foreign anticompetitive schemes for the very
purpose of causing harmful downstream effects in the United States.”).
192. See id. (holding that when the direct purchaser’s injury is not a result of the effects
on American commerce, such effects do not give rise to its claim); see also In re Monosodium
Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 539–40 (8th Cir. 2007).
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bring suit under Illinois Brick, the DOJ should still be able to prosecute an-
ticompetitive conduct overseas given the importance of maintaining cartel
deterrence.193
Additionally, the concerns with comity that arise in the context of the
FTAIA do not apply with equal force to the DOJ.194 Through prosecutorial
discretion, “[t]he United States carefully considers international comity and
exercises prudence before bringing any antitrust enforcement actions that
might implicate the interests of a foreign jurisdiction.”195 Private plaintiffs,
meanwhile, are not generally trusted to carefully weigh deference to foreign
governments when determining whether to sue for civil damages.196 To en-
sure that DOJ can continue to deter criminal antitrust conduct overseas in
compliance with the FTAIA, it is necessary to avoid adopting the “direct
means direct” understanding of Illinois Brick and antitrust standing
requirements.
Interpreting “direct” to require a reasonably causal nexus will not cause
all foreign conduct to be swept into the FTAIA’s effects exception. First, it
will not always be possible to establish substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effects when foreign-produced, antitrust-violating components are built into
finished products sold in the United States. In some situations there may be
so many degrees of separation that the connection between the price fixing
and the domestic effect is “highly attenuated, insignificant, or unpredict-
able”—but just one additional step in the distribution chain should not nec-
essarily yield that result.197 Still, it is possible that there could be a “close,
significant, and predictable causal connection” between a “major compo-
nent made and sold” in foreign commerce and finished products in Ameri-
can commerce; indirect purchasers should not be unilaterally excluded from
the effects exception.198 The “gives rise to” prong of the effects exception
under Empagran I also substantially limits the breadth of the exception: all
independently caused foreign harm will fall outside of the scope of the anti-
trust laws. “The direct effect requirement helps ensure that the [antitrust
laws are] not used to police anticompetitive conduct whose impact, as a
practical matter, is limited to foreign markets and, thus, is best addressed by
foreign nations.”199 Finally, courts are also free to invoke the principle of
comity to deny standing.200
193. See Corbitt & Sheanin, supra note 26, at 8–10.
194. Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745
(2015).
195. Supplemental Brief, supra note 93, at 10.
196. See e.g., Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 826–27.
197. Supplemental Brief, supra note 93, at 2.
198. Id. at 5.
199. Id. at 3.
200. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993).
334 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:309
B. Interpreting Motorola II: Comity and Implications
In November 2014, the Seventh Circuit held that Motorola could not
bring a section 4 Clayton Act claim against foreign cell phone screen manu-
facturers that had allegedly sold price-fixed screens to Motorola subsidiaries
overseas.201 The court assumed arguendo that there had been direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects on American commerce, and pro-
ceeded to find that the effects did not give rise to Motorola’s claims on
behalf of its subsidiaries.202 Motorola II may be the first case of its kind to
directly tackle the issues raised by the direct purchaser rule and the FTAIA.
Although the Seventh Circuit seemed to reject the application of the own-
or-control exception when the case fell under the FTAIA,203 this Section dif-
ferentiates Motorola II from a true example of the own-or-control exception,
and concludes that traditional exceptions to Illinois Brick should still apply
when the requirements of the FTAIA’s effects exception are met.
Although the Motorola II court discussed the own-or-control exception,
the facts of the case did not satisfy the reasons for the own-or-control excep-
tion. The own-or-control exception is meant to apply to cases in which the
owner or controller of the direct purchaser specifically reimbursed the exact
amount to its subsidiary. In Motorola II, the relationship between Motorola
and its subsidiaries was not so clear cut. The Seventh Circuit examined the
footnote from Illinois Brick creating the own-or-control exception—noting
that because the Court said only that there “might be” an exception, the
Seventh Circuit was at liberty not to apply one in that case.204 Judge Posner,
writing for the court, explained that even if he were to hypothetically apply
the own-or-control exception and treat Motorola as “one” with its subsidi-
aries, Motorola would still fail under the second prong of the effects test.205
Because the subsidiaries made purchases overseas and incurred damages
from the price fixing overseas, the possible domestic effect on American
commerce did not give rise to Motorola’s claim on the subsidiaries’ behalf.
Strangely, Motorola “argued only that its foreign subsidiaries overpaid” for
the screens and did not argue that it paid more for the phones as a result,206
so Motorola essentially failed to allege that it was damaged. Additionally, the
court emphasized how difficult it would be to apportion the damages, one
of the key policy matters in deciding to apply Illinois Brick exceptions and an
indication that the own-or-control exception was not truly applicable in the
first place.207
201. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 817–18.
202. Id. at 819 (“[T]he cartel-engendered price increase in the components and in the
price of cellphones that incorporated them occurred entirely in foreign commerce.”).
203. See id. at 823.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 823–24.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 821.
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A true own-or-control example might pass muster under Motorola II. If,
instead of some nebulous relationship with its subsidiaries, Motorola had
simply sent an agent to China to purchase its screens, and then, upon that
agent’s return to the United States, paid her for her entire expenditure, it
seems likely the exception would apply. Assuming a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on American commerce, the injury to Motorola
would have been a part of that anticompetitive effect in the United States or
perhaps considered as import commerce and therefore exempt from the
FTAIA altogether.
The Seventh Circuit failed to set broader rules for when and how courts
should apply the exceptions to Illinois Brick, but left room for them to apply
the exceptions in the FTAIA context. First, Motorola II’s comity concerns,
even if valid, would not apply in most situations implicating Illinois Brick
exceptions. The court stated that because the direct purchasers were incor-
porated and regulated under foreign law, comity principles prevented Amer-
ican courts from interfering and demanded that such direct purchasers seek
redress in their countries of incorporation.208 This, however, was a problem
in Motorola II mainly because Motorola seemed to be suing on its subsidiar-
ies’ behalf and not for the amount it overpaid in the United States.209 Such
comity principles would probably not apply if the indirect purchaser had
evidence of its own harm, thus demonstrating an injury that occurred in the
United States rather than abroad and satisfying the effects exception under
the FTAIA. Similarly, if the foreign direct purchaser were owned or con-
trolled by, or co-conspirators with, the price fixer (instead of its customer, as
in Motorola II), the court’s specific comity analysis would not apply since the
American customer might not have had easy access to the foreign antitrust
enforcement system.
Properly understood, exceptions to the direct purchaser rule do not in-
fringe on comity by expanding the reach of the FTAIA. Parties overseas who
incurred injuries independent of (or prior to) effects on American com-
merce will still be prevented from suing by Empagran I and the second
prong of the effects exception. The federal courts should create a rule that
allows all of the exceptions to the direct purchaser rule to apply to the
FTAIA. This would decrease the probability that international cartels would
be able to conspire with impunity to reach American consumers through
foreign subsidiaries (defendant control) or co-conspirators. The rule would
also capture cases in which, although technically indirect purchasers, Ameri-
can companies have bought at fixed prices from agents whom they control.
Although Motorola II rejected a broad exception to Illinois Brick when
“applying the doctrine would prevent any American company from suing,”
the case is best understood as holding that Motorola did not meet the sec-
ond prong of the FTAIA effects exception because it did not show that the
effects on domestic commerce actually injured it.210 Therefore, in cases in
208. Id. at 827.
209. See id. at 823–24.
210. Id. at 823–24.
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which an Illinois Brick exception is actually satisfied, Motorola II still per-
mits American indirect purchasers to sue when they can show the requisite
effects gave rise to their claims.
C. International Policy: Justifying Exceptions
Applying the exceptions to the direct purchaser rule (such as the co-
conspirator and defendant control exceptions) in the FTAIA context reaps
the same benefits as the generic Illinois Brick exceptions: apportionment of
damages is simplified, the risk of multiple recovery is reduced significantly,
and American consumers are encouraged to engage in active and efficient
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws.
First, exceptions to the direct purchaser rule should apply in the FTAIA
context because they will not complicate damages calculations any more
than they would in the domestic context. Even assuming international anti-
trust cases are more complex than domestic cases, the FTAIA explicitly
sweeps international conduct into the clutches of the antitrust laws when
plaintiffs satisfy the effects exception.211 In the domestic context, Illinois
Brick is concerned that permitting indirect purchasers to sue will “greatly
complicate and reduce the effectiveness of already protracted” legal proceed-
ings.212 Applying exceptions such as the defendant control and co-conspira-
tor exceptions, however, should avoid complicating the process by treating
the direct purchaser and antitrust violator as one entity.213 Because these
exceptions to the direct purchaser rule do not further complicate antitrust
cases, they are valid in the international context and, therefore, indirect pur-
chasers should be permitted to sue in such cases.
Permitting indirect purchasers to sue under Illinois Brick exceptions also
encourages the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws while avoiding
duplicative recovery. In the FTAIA context, duplicative recovery has two
sides, international and domestic. In the international context, there is no
foolproof way to avoid all overlap between judgments in foreign countries
for direct purchasers and judgments in the United States for indirect pur-
chasers. For several reasons, this potential overlap is not overly concerning.
First, Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe were especially concerned with dupli-
cative private damages awards,214 but most foreign countries do not allow
any private damages for antitrust violations.215 Even if a foreign state did
permit private antitrust damages, the exceptions to Illinois Brick should al-
low indirect purchasers to sue only when it would be unlikely for the direct
211. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
212. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 (1977).
213. See supra Section II.A.
214. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 731.
215. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[F]oreign antitrust laws rarely
authorize private damages actions.”), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (2015).
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purchaser to bring suit.216 Finally, if direct purchasers are owned by or con-
spiring with antitrust violators, it seems unlikely that foreign courts would
believe they were truly harmed and award them damages.
Precisely because direct purchasers are very unlikely to sue if they are
co-conspirators or owned by the antitrust violator, there is also little danger
of duplicative recovery in the United States, which is “[a] primary considera-
tion of the courts in deciding whether or not to carve an exception to Illinois
Brick.”217 Foreign direct purchasers may also have difficulty demonstrating
that the injury in the United States gave rise to their claim under the
FTAIA—perhaps precluding them from suing in the United States altogether
and preventing duplicative recovery. Even if duplicative recovery in the
United States were possible, courts could require safeguards similar to those
already limiting the co-conspirator exception. For example, the application
of the exception could be limited to instances in which the direct purchaser
can be joined, like the co-conspirator exception,218 or instances in which the
direct purchaser has already been denied standing under the FTAIA’s causa-
tion element through a binding judgment.
If direct purchasers are unlikely to sue because they fall into the scope of
one of the exceptions, then permitting indirect purchasers to sue under the
FTAIA would also further the goal of enforcing the antitrust laws through
private plaintiffs. The threat of treble damages in the United States might
have the valuable impact of deterring foreign anticompetitive conduct that
reaches the United States. Although the FTAIA was meant to limit the scope
of the antitrust laws219—and thereby limit the number of individuals quali-
fied to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act—a reason-
able Congress would not have intended to create a loophole for conspiring
international entities. Illinois Brick “was concerned not merely that direct
purchasers have sufficient incentive to bring suit . . . but rather that at least
some party have sufficient incentive to bring suit.”220 When the require-
ments for the Illinois Brick exceptions are met, the only individuals with
incentives and standing to bring civil suits may be American indirect
purchasers.
Whether the defendant violated U.S. antitrust laws abroad or domesti-
cally, the exceptions to Illinois Brick discussed in this Note are equally valid
and effective. These exceptions avoid overly complicating the apportionment
of damages, prevent duplicative recovery, and encourage the enforcement of
216. See Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“But because as a practical matter the chance of a direct-purchaser suit is so small, the corre-
spondingly small risk of multiple recovery does not disturb us.”).
217. Musheno, supra note 129, at 267.
218. See supra Part II.
219. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 4 (1982); see Empagran I, 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) (“Con-
gress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way,
the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce.”).
220. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 n.6 (1989).
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the antitrust laws. Accordingly, courts should apply them with equal force in
both the domestic and the FTAIA contexts.
Conclusion
American consumers suffering direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effects of anticompetitive activity are “those individuals whose pro-
tection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws.”221 Illinois Brick
recognized the limits of this stance by admitting that actual harm to indirect
purchasers in the United States would go unaddressed because of the direct
purchaser rule.222 Still, the Supreme Court deemed deterrence and judicial
efficiency best served by having direct purchasers sue.223 Many states, schol-
ars, and even Congress have criticized this rule, although neither Congress
nor the Court has ever overturned it.224 The policies in Illinois Brick control,
and they do not appear to be changing.225 Accordingly, the courts will have
to grapple with them in the FTAIA context.
In the domestic context, the traditional exceptions to Illinois Brick and
the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions are widely considered
to satisfy the Illinois Brick policy concerns. In the FTAIA context, these ex-
ceptions should still apply. The policy concerns are comparable, and the
result avoids a significant civil loophole for international cartels. Sooner or
later, the Supreme Court will grant a petition for a writ of certiorari to
clarify these rules and the application of the FTAIA.226 When the case arises,
the Supreme Court should clarify that the traditional exceptions, the defen-
dant control exception, and the co-conspirator exception to the direct pur-
chaser rule will apply to FTAIA cases that satisfy the policy considerations of
Illinois Brick.
221. Mid-W. Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 1979)
(quoting Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976)).
222. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746 (“It is true that, in elevating direct purchasers to a
preferred position as private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule denies recovery to those
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